Can we build it?
Lessons and speculations on literary computing

Willard McCarty
staff.cch.kcl.ac.uk/~wmccarty/

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What remains indubitable is that the new is never as mellow
as the old, and that therefore the worship of mellowness is
incompatible with new excellence.

Bertrand Russell, Portraits from Memory (1958/1956: 93)


The relationship between literary computing and literary criticism has had
a problematic history. In 1966, when the first professional journal in the field,
Computers and the Humanities, began, groundbreaking activity became
suddenly visible across the disciplines. Early, dramatic successes in
computing had stirred popular and scholarly interest in what computers were
doing and might be able to do. In 1957 Herbert Simon had made startling
predictions for the subsequent decade: “Put it bluntly (hard now to shock)”,
he wrote in his lecture notes, “Machines think! learn! create!”¹ In a similar
vein, British computational linguist Margaret Masterman declared in her
contribution to Freeing the Mind, a series published in the Times Literary
Supplement in 1962, that the computer was a “telescope of the mind” which
like its astronomical namesake would soon “enlarge the whole range of what
its possessors could see and do” and so change “their whole picture of the
world” (38f) – words quoted approvingly four years later in a book on the

Two contemporaneous technical assessments told a very different story,
however. In Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence Herbert Dreyfus diagnosed
stagnation in AI research, pointing to unexpected difficulties which had
followed the early successes. What had been assumed to be a difference of
degree, between current and envisioned systems, had turned out to be a
difference in kind with no known way across the discontinuities (1965: iii, 9).

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¹ Simon 1957, later incorporated into Simon and Newell 1958a; the predictions, having
encountered objections, were repeated with emphasis in Simon and Newell 1958b.
The following year the devastating “black book” on machine translation, 
*Language and Machines: Computers in Translation and Linguistics*, came to more or less the same conclusion (ALPAC 1966: 32). As Yorick Wilks noted a few years later, “it had been clear for some time that the era of simple-minded MT was over” (1972: 4) and that a new, very different research paradigm was needed. In literary computing a similar turning point was reached when it became obvious that incremental efforts were not enough. In 1965 poet and English professor Ephim Fogel warned against underestimating the difficulties ahead, but he spoke in terms of a “Vision-Actuality Interval” that however wearisome to traverse was, he thought, only a matter of time, fortitude and steadily accumulating resources (1965). By the late 1970s, when these were more or less to hand (Rommel 2004: 93), it had become clear to at least some in the humanities that linear progress along well established lines would never reach the envisioned goal. Again, a new way of thinking was needed. In 1978, for example, Susan Wittig pointed out that computing had undoubtedly allowed for improvements, making performance of old tasks more efficient and accurate, but it had not delivered on the vision’s promise (211). The attempt to traverse Fogel’s interval had revealed a chasm yawning beneath.

Susan Hockey has summarized the prevalent view of the computer in 20th-century literary research “as an invaluable assistant” to scholarship, most usefully deployed to probe for textual surface-features and so to prompt the enquirer to reflect “on the methodology used to interpret the results” (2000: 84). But the problematic separation that this view implies between theory and practice was already noticed by the late 1970s, when blame for failure of practitioners to realise Masterman’s vision was fixed squarely on inattention to theory. A computing without theory, Colin Martindale argued, was no better than a method in search of a paradigm to direct and explain it (1978: 275f). Wittig argued that as a result literary computing was vulnerable to covert influence by a positivistic “concept of text” derived ultimately from New Criticism (1978: 211). Richard Bailey, quoting both Wittig and Martindale, declared that practitioners were blindly groping their way through criticism’s past, with a time-lag of about 50 years (1978: 7).

Thus as early as 1978 the whistle was blown on naïve literary computing, but until recently few seem to have noticed. The dominant focus on data and on the mechanics of processing has meant that however excellent in kind, however supportive of interpretation, literary computing has tended silently to perpetuate rather than to challenge or even to examine the concept of text to which those whistleblowers objected. Despite the intention to “enable new and innovative approaches to humanistic scholarship” (Frischer et al. 2006), discussions of tool-building have likewise been preoccupied with features of
software, continuing to allow old ideas their shadowy power, ignoring the discourse of criticism as it has moved on. It can hardly be surprising that a decade after Wittig, in the year that the text-analysis program TACT was released to the public, Rosanne Potter remarked that literary computing had “not been rejected, but rather neglected” by mainstream criticism – a complaint repeated many times since. Numerous reasons for this neglect have been offered, but the fact remains that literary computing has had very little to say in response to critical discourse for the last half-century. In the preface to Radiant Textuality (2001), Jerome McGann noted its instrumental role in “the technical and pre-critical occupations” on which scholarship depends but its almost total absence from interpretative procedures (2001: xii).

It would be a mistake, however, to say that the fault lies solely with literary computing for its neglect of theory. For the past several decades most theorizing, shading into what Jonathan Culler has called “just plain ‘theory’” (1997: 1), has offered few points of contact with the study of actual texts, and so little few possibilities for coaxing computing practitioners out of their theoretical silence. In addition, the social division in universities that has separated the non-technically educated theorists and critics from the less institutionally privileged technical experts has impeded and in some countries continues greatly to impede progress. But a case for social change depends largely on making the intellectual, disciplinary argument.

In the article I have already cited, Martindale pointed out that both literary theory and literary computing “have strengths and weaknesses, but the striking thing is that the strengths of one are the weaknesses of the other. If the two were meshed,” he suggested, “the weaknesses would largely be cancelled out.” But rather than mesh, empirical and theoretical approaches have been taken up each in turn, each taken as the answer rather than as the answer’s other half. Leonard Forster noted in his Presidential Address to the Modern Humanities Association in 1978 that as a result we get dogmatic abstractions, the criticism formed around them becoming what he called “a flight from literature”. He recommended a “flexible pragmatism” analogous to the craftsman’s, who selects now this tool, now that one to accomplish whatever task is at hand. Forster’s metaphor is a good one, not because it privileges the scholarly task over the tool (the timid mantra of service-orientated computing) but because it places tools in the context of an active interface between craftsman and material. The moral of the story is that neither the task nor to the tools hold the secret. What’s needed is attention to the craftsmanship, to the process and practice of that which criticism entails.

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2. **The matchmaker’s tasks**

Literary computing can doubtless continue as the “invaluable assistant” to scholarship, following criticism wherever it goes and trying its best to be of service. But scattered results from literary computing – for example in computational stylistics and in highly interpretative markup – suggests Martindale’s Leibnizian marriage of theorist and empiric is not only possible but also holds great promise for both sides. The fact that literary computing remains vigorous, however ghettoized by specialist concerns into specialist periodicals (Cornes 1991), suggests an artificially limited rather than moribund research programme. The question is, what now must be done to realise the possibilities?

In *Humanities Computing* (2005) I took up part of the task by concentrating on the theoretical implications of computing as an analytical approach to the study of the humanities as a whole. I presented a negative epistemology, arguing that the primary function of computing is not to automate knowing but to identify what we somehow know but cannot adequately specify. Because computing gives us manipulatory power over the models we construct, we are able rapidly to close on that which cannot be formulated. Thus we are confronted with our own quite specific ignorance of cultural artefacts and so are better equipped to question them. For literary studies this epistemology takes computing significantly beyond the standard view of an efficient but essentially mute and obedient handmaiden by challenging us in detail to account for the failure of any rigorously analytical try for a systematic order of things. But it takes us no further than the negative gift with positive consequences that lie somehow beyond what any such try can in principle do.

The situation in which we find ourselves suggests an analogy to the observational sciences. As Ian Hacking has argued for microscopy, the fundamental problem raised by all observational instruments (including the telescope to which Masterman appeals) is that we “don’t just peer” through them to newly visible objects that are as we see them to be, independently of the viewing. We must also “interfere” with the incoming data based on what we know of what we are trying to observe. We must make sense with these data, sometimes by intervening in the observational process, sometimes by altering the object of study. This we simply cannot do, or do well, without a good idea

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3 Hacking 1983: 186-209. For the computer as microscope, see e.g. ALPAC 1966: 121, Gilmour-Bryson 1984: 11; for microscope and telescope, Denning 2007; more generally, Mahoney 2000: 31. Frege, echoing Leibniz, used the microscope as a metaphor for his *Begriffsschrift* (notation of concepts), for which see Göranzon 1993: 44 and Crane 2003: 24.
of what we are looking at. In literary studies such knowing interference is not, as in the sciences, so much a preliminary step toward consensus about the object in view as it is an ongoing, never-ending process. The literary object in view is hardly an object at all but the contingent, interactive, emergent outcome we wisely use a gerund to name: reading.

For centuries, of course, the codex book has functioned as such an observational instrument – I. A. Richards’ “machine to think with”⁴ – encouraging interpretative interference with the flow of language, even (e.g. in critical editions and commentaries) providing optional sequences of interfering moves. This is the book not only as metatheoretical statement but as analogue to firmware.⁵ Computing foregrounds book-as-machine, especially in the design and construction of digital reference works. But “computing” is also significantly a gerund, not a name for an action or set of actions but a name for acting. It is, I argued in Humanities Computing, fundamentally a modelling machine. Hence its introduction into literary studies implicitly shifts emphasis from representation to intervening, and so implies that theorizing of text at the fundamental level of tool design and use is essential.

If this is so, then much more than the epistemological question is at stake. To be brought to ask how we know what we somehow know but cannot represent computationally is a major step forward, but it is preliminary to asking the ontological question Wittig raised in 1978 and McGann again in 2004: what is text that it eludes all such representation – that it can be, in McGann’s words, “the hem of a quantum garment” (2004: 201)? Analytical literary computing tells us how to exploit the unavoidable difference between textual representation and reality, but it has nothing at all to say about what we choose to represent. Even if we agree (as we certainly should not) to limit the textual object of study to its verbal data, trouble starts with the context required for interpretation. The dominant consensus within a critical specialism may obscure the problem and often does. But we are warned of it by the crippling difficulties of infinite regress that the very idea of context appears to cause whenever anyone asks what exactly it is a promissory note for (Scharfstein 1989). Context, Jonathan Culler remarked, is merely more text and so appeal to it solves nothing (1988: 93f). But appealing to it, particularly if it is to be modelled computationally across the open domain of literature (or of real life) reveals how unsatisfactorily arbitrary and limiting the unspoken notion or any analytic formulation of it is. The problem of context is the problem of text. What is it?

⁵ On the critical edition as metatheoretical statement, see McGann 2001: 75-97.
By failing to ask this question, literary computing is confined to providing evidence for or against what we already know or suspect. It is strongly inhibited in its capacity to surprise. Providing evidence seems justification enough, but evidence becomes increasingly problematic as the volume of data exceeds the norm for critical practices formed prior to the exponential growth of online resources. As this volume increases, so does the probability of arbitrary choice, and so the ease with which any statement may be connected to any other. Good critics may do better scholarship by finding more of what they need; bad critics may be swiftly becoming worse ones more easily. The point, however, is that literary computing has thereby served only as mutely obedient handmaiden, and so done nothing much to rescue itself from its position of weakness, from which it can hardly deliver the benefits claimed for it by the faithful. It has done little to educate scholars methodologically.

There is, of course, no single answer to the Wittig-McGann question, because there are many kinds of text, many ideas of what to do with each kind and every reason to think that these kinds and ideas are limited only by human ingenuity. Given the renewed prominence that McGann’s work has brought to the question, what can be done is to develop ways of asking it such that responses can be made in software.

An obvious starting point is with inherited tools of reference, e.g. lexicons, critical editions and commentaries, inferring from them the ideas of text they implement. To the degree this has been done, in aid of speculating about or designing a software equivalent, results suggest the prominent role of tacit uses in the social contexts of argument and in the building or maintaining of a social imaginary (McCarty 2004). I will return to the importance of this later. We get caught up in an examination of inherited genres, however, by starting with existing software tools, enquiring after their emergent theoretical tendencies. What follows from this enquiry is engagement with the answer provoked by the question that such conceptual archaeology implies: if literary text is more than what these tools say that it is, as it clearly is, then what is it? From that engagement comes not merely better tools (hence another round of provocations to theorizing) but also the spelling out of theory which tool-building requires.

3. What the tools say

We know from unsatisfactory experience that none of these tools do very well with the Wittig-McGann question, but to do anything useful at all, they must afford a view of it that can be recovered.
Initially the answers we get back from existing tools are impoverished. A concordancer, for example, implies that by “text” we mean a corpus informed by verbal correspondence of passages and by the words that collocate with whatever word is in focus. Both relational database design and formal ontologies imply an instantiated set of concepts and their interrelations, and prior to these, well-defined perspectives of enquiry. An annotation tool affords a view of text as the occasion for commentary. A statistical analyzer yields a complex population of verbal clues to a literary style. These are all valid, even highly valuable aspects of text, but again, they are isolated and so isolating.

We can, however, greatly enrich what each has to contribute by considering their historical origins. The most obvious to be explored is concordancing, a direct descendant of the late 12th or early 13th-century device invented to serve figural interpretation of the Bible, which once it achieved formal stability in the late 13th Century remained broadly the same until computing (McCarty 1993). The keyword-in-context format, devised in the 1950s to satisfy the needs and capabilities of automation, shifted focus from concordant passages of a text to shared collocates of a word, and so moved the principal domain of use from literary studies to corpus linguistics. Nevertheless the mechanized idea of semantic triangulation basic to the figural scheme remains implicit in the tool which that scheme articulates and so in the results the tool produces. It bears with it or more accurately implies a theory and compositional principle derived from the most influential text in the European tradition. So also the tools and techniques of annotation imply a partial answer to the Wittig-McGann question. These have historical roots in ancient commentary practice, including manuscript glosses, marginalia, free-standing notes and other forms of intertextuality, together with their social networks (McCarty 2004). Relational database design and textual ontologies are similarly emergent from older practices of categorization and tabular layout beginning with ancient libraries, and more recently from the strong cultural predisposition toward discontinuous plurality. Lev Manovich’s argument for the database as a symbolic form provides a starting point here (2001).

4. Turning to confront the context

Writing a conceptual history of literary computing from its tools helps to give it a theoretical voice, but at best the exercise yields a semi-coherent miscellany with uncertain relationship to actual research. The result is worse than might be expected because the ideas of text we seek are partially in the tools, partially in unexpected uses of them (especially true of those tools not designed for the purpose) and, in the usual situation where more than one tool is used, partially in which tools are applied in what sequence. Lacking in
a tradition of experimental work, under-educated technologically and so undervaluing or simply not seeing the mediation tools perform, researchers have tended to omit the kind of observations we need. Unsurprisingly, evidence from the scholarly record, in the rare instances in which it exists at all, is scattered through footnotes and asides in publications across many disciplines.

In any case, there is no whole for these parts to sum to, no great idea of text that may be assembled from the scattered fragments of its implementation. The point of asking the Wittig-McGann question is quite otherwise: to enable literary computing to make a great inductive leap from its mute servant’s mimetic doldrums to an understanding of itself as a full participant in the interpretative operations of criticism. To devise new tools without the benefit of that question has not and will not significantly increase the mildly helpful but severely cobbled abilities of literary computing no matter how much data accumulates.

McGann’s own response to the question has been to argue for the reversal of perspective within criticism already implied by the Bakhtinian situating of text in an “immense, boundless world of others’ words” (Bakhtin 1986: 143). The details of this response, including the online game IVANHOE, are best presented by his own writings, which are here taken as required reading and as a point of departure, to which I will return. But that reversal of perspective is already inescapable given the problem of context, which itself seems inevitable once we free literary computing from the strictures of a knowledge jukebox to become a project for modelling literature. The fundamental role of modelling is itself an inevitable consequence of the Universal Turing Machine (McCarty 2005: 170-2).

The term “modelling” is so polysemous that its meaning cannot be taken for granted, so I had better say what I mean by it here. In Humanities Computing I argued for the analytical, mimetic kind that Clifford Geertz has called “modelling-of” (1993/1973: 93), which aims at refinement of the epistemological question, as noted earlier, and not, as in some fields, development of a stable representation bordering on a theory of the represented phenomenon. Geertz distinguished this kind from its opposite, “modelling-for”, a more or less creative realisation of an idea or design achieved through perfective, exploratory manipulation. (Design for a new airplane wing is a straightforward example.) The Bakhtinian reversal, however, entails a different sort of modelling from either of those two,

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something that resembles modelling-for but begins without a pre-existing design, or at least not a consciously accessible one. It is a mapless modelling “forward”, toward something that is not yet anything. Using the musicological term, I call it “improvisational modelling” to denote its serendipitous, moment-by-moment development in performance of an emergent potential. This sort of modelling is widely attested in the experimental sciences. Because it involves arriving, “by accidents and sagacity”, at other than what one is looking for or exists to be seen, this kind may rightly be called serendipitous as well. Pek Van Andel points out that pure serendipity cannot be programmed (1994), but then modelling is not pure but a compromising interplay between algorithms and the world. So there is no contradiction, only questions to be asked. What a serendipitous modelling might be for text reflects, again, the Wittig-McGann question.

5. Bridging discourse

It is a truism that asking questions is central to the humanities, and that good research leads from a worthy question to a better one. The Wittig-McGann question is certainly worthy, but it leaves us with the problem of how to reformulate it so that it may be asked in software, more effectively.

Before we can even get properly started, that is, we must confront the gulf separating the language of criticism from the language of implementation. Happily this gulf is bridgeable. In fact collaborative projects in the digital humanities have for years negotiated it as a matter of course by developing common ways of talking about problems and objects that have different meanings for the various participants. But although collaboration offers the great benefit of other-mindedness, alone it is an inefficient and only partially effective means of furthering research that is fundamentally the result of two or more intersecting, interacting practices. Collaboration wherever possible needs to be internalized so that the interacting can occur at the speed of thought as well as at the pace of meetings. Hence the need for a bridging discourse.

The time-honoured approach for building a new discourse is to reach into older, better established fields for promising figures of speech and thought,

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8 Gooding, for example, focuses on the products of such modelling rather than the process; he names them construals, “flexible, quasi-linguistic messengers between the perceptual and the conceptual” (1986: 208) or “tentative representations of possible outcomes... continually constructed and revised to describe and communicate actual outcomes” (1992: 103).

9 As Merton and Barber have shown (2004), serendipity is so responsive to the conditions under which the word is invoked as to require extensive discussion. I cannot give it its due here.

then to assimilate them (McCarty 2005: 114-57). In each case a connection is established from the poorly understood phenomenon or system with which one is working to a better understood analogue in another discipline. The analogy links relationships, not things: as A is to B (within one system) so C is to D (in another). Its strongest claim is that the two systems, however different, are isotropic, i.e. the same governing laws or principles apply in both. Hence a strong analogy not only holds up to examination and yields many insights, it also pulls the connected fields closer together by emphasizing similar processes operating in both. Each analogical connection must be probed for its actual benefits as well as cognitive trajectory, but because its yield may not be known for some time, the best anyone may be able to hope for is plausibility at the outset. Analogizing is conjectural. Considerable effort is required to maintain an analogy as a conjectural move and not blur it into an identity, especially when it appears greatly to simplify an intractable problem such as the one under consideration here. In other words, borrowing is as perilous as it is powerful.

In the present case what we are looking for is, in the words of a London improvisational musician, how one gets “from A to C when there is no B” (Bailey 1992: 136). If, that is, we begin, as readers do, with a text, and so with the question of how reading may be modelled, we need to bridge the gulf between Bakhtinian language and a design strategy for a computing system capable of implementing its outward-looking, improvisational trajectory. One promising place to begin is with evolutionary biology, whose fundamental problem is precisely to answer the improvisational question for living systems. In his famous series of lectures published as *What is Life?* (1943), physicist Erwin Schrödinger asked this question because the physical sciences as he knew them, and largely as we know them, strangely could not provide an answer. (They should: living forms are physio-chemical entities.) Theoretical biologist Robert Rosen, commenting on Schrödinger’s project, has argued that by asking his question, illegitimate within the confines of ordinary science, Schrödinger diagnosed the fatally constricting path of reductionist methods that had had such great influence on 20th-century thought. “[O]ur universes [of scientific discourse] are limited,” Rosen declared, “not by the demands of problems that need to be solved, but by extraneous standards of rigor. The result is a mind-set of reductionism, of looking only downward toward subsystems, and never upward and outward” (2000: 2). What he does not say, but needs here to be said, is that the influence of scientific discourse on all others has been so great that this “mind-set of reductionism” has been ours as well. So also, analogically, is the alternative Rosen presents: a turn toward the quasi-teleological but non-

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11 Much closer to an actual language of design is Eco 1984: 3-43, but Eco sketches states and transitions between them rather than processes.
deterministic idea of self-organizing systems, hence the ideas of complexity, emergence and autopoiesis (of which McGann makes extensive use) coming primarily from the culturally ascendant biological sciences, including biological anthropology.

Biology and its nearest neighbours (which, after all, still lie at a formidable conceptual distance from criticism) are not the only fields concerned with how more sophisticated systems arise from less sophisticated ones, however. Other likely candidates include anthropological linguistics and conversation analysis; improvisational musicology, including but not limited to studies of jazz; and the cognitive sciences, where for example the psychology of reading meets its neurological correlates. These are all promising sources for analogies.

6. An improvisational companion to criticism

Perhaps now it is worthwhile returning to Margaret Masterman’s “telescope of the mind” to ask what sort of computational instrument might live up to the promise of enlarging “the whole range” of what we might see and do as critics and so change our “whole picture” of literature.

The most imaginatively powerful attempt to date is IVANHOE, an online play-space in which participants intervene, change, add to and comment on the discourse field of a given cultural artefact. The critical objective of the players is to explore in blog-like exchanges the possible worlds or imaginative trajectories of this artefact from an authorial “inner standing-point”. Computational tools aid the interpretative play by managing communications and by visualising the interactions of players so as to stimulate their imaginations. Scope of play is constrained to the focal artefact, which players are assumed to know. Googling for whatever is permitted, but the game’s tools do not aid or direct the search. IVANHOE is thus more closely analogous to a microscope than a telescope, but it is of Masterman’s kind nevertheless because it is built explicitly and self-consciously for looking outward from the artefact toward its manifold possibilities.

In the rationale for IVANHOE, McGann borrows extensively from theoretical biology and elsewhere, as I have suggested we need to do, but the analogies are rhetorical rather than computational. My research question is this: can we do more? Can we use these analogies to design modelling machines capable of finding connections from a given literary text to others, or can we adapt whatever software may exist, for example to simulate evolutionary or improvisational development? In 1989 Northrop Frye mentioned in passing the possibility that modelling such as I have described might be used to converge on fundamental structures of literature through systematic
investigation of its recurring conventional units (1991: 6). Is this a realizable goal?

It’s clear from what I have said that although such a modelling machine must be able to search all text in digital form, mere searching is not only insufficient but perilous without some kind of automated guidance. It’s clear from the massiveness of the collection to be searched that only the most rudimentary metadata, if any at all, can be expected. It’s clear that whatever the instrument does, it must be far more of a cognitively intimate companion than a bot, however semantic the web that gets searched. Searching will need to start from a reading, somehow specified, of a given text, produce results from the textual collection and learn from the reader’s response, modifying both future and existing results according to what it learns. Hence, because the envisioned operations are massively combinatorial, they may well require more computing power than is easily available, at least now. They may be supercomputerish. Finally, it’s evident that tools of some kind, perhaps like IVANHOE offering visual representations, will be needed so that the investigator can direct the machine more effectively and imagine more generously than otherwise.

The question of how to build such a thing is in essence the question of where the permeable, moving membrane is between reader and device, or to put the matter differently, how great a role computing can play in criticism. This is, in effect, the question of artificial intelligence, and so presumably a matter of keen interest for AI research. It is the most intimate, most promising encounter possible between literary theorist and literary empiric. But can it be done?
Works cited


